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REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
GDC's arguments in this appeal are not complex. On the first issue, GDC has
shown that, given the substantial evidence that would have supported a verdict in GDC's
favor on its fraud claim, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the Wardley
Defendants on that claim. See Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, TJ20, 190 P.3d 1269 (this
court will affirm a directed verdict only if "after examining all evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a
verdict in the non-moving party's favor") (emphasis added).
Rather than address the trial evidence directly and argue that the directed verdict
survives the standard of review, the Appellees (collectively "Wardley" or "the Wardley
Defendants") seek to draw attention away from the evidence—arguing that, even if the
trial court erred, it was harmless. First, they attempt to bootstrap the jury's special
verdict by asserting that the jury's answer to a question about a contract claim suggests
how they would have answered a question about GDC's fraud claim. But, this argument
is logically flawed because it requires one to speculate and assume that the jury would
have answered a fundamentally different question the same way. Second, the Wardley
Defendants claim that the directed verdict was harmless because GDC suffered no
damages caused by their fraud—a repeat of an argument that was rejected below.
Finally, in the only argument remotely addressing the evidence, the Wardley Defendants
contend that, given their definition of the term "involved," a jury could not have found in
favor of GDC. This argument also lacks merit and the Wardley Defendants' semantics
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lesson is unavailing when faced w It! 1 controlling law. In short, ;•• 'A .*-'k^ I VTcndants'
arguments show that the directed verdict is indefensible and should be reversed.
On the second issue, GDC has shown that the trial court's grant of attorney's fees
was legally flawed. Specifically, the trial court erred because it granted fees for
unsuccessful motions and duplicative/unnecessary work, and also applied a rate from
outside of the "locality" as required by the applicable rule. The Wardley Defendants'
response ranges from an effort to circumvent appellate review altogether to an attempt to
sever a reasonableness determination from the governing legal parameters. These
contentions, however, cannot justify affirming the fee award, especially when measured
against the legal standards governing a reasonableness determination.
Given the trial court's errors, this Court should reverse the trial coui t's verdict,
remand the matter for a new trial, or at least remand for a determination on the
reasonableness of fees.
I.

1 1 IE DIR ECTED \ ER DI (" i1 W' A S F K U O N K 011S.
A.

The Jury's Special Verdict On The Breach Of Contract Claim Does
Not Defeat The Fraud Claim.

Wardley first argues (at Br. 24-26) "no harm no foul," asserting that the jury's
special verdict necessarily defeats GDC's fraud claim, abrogating any claims of error
concerning the directed verdict. Wardley is wrong. The jury simply did not address
fraudulent nondisclosure. The jury did not find that GDC failed to meet the elements of
fraudiilent nondisclosure. In fact, the jury was never asked t
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••ns'dr'- • '^> claim or these

elements. Instead, the trial court removed the claim from the jury—hence this appeal.
The jury was asked, and answered, only a single question:
Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that Gilbert Development
Corporation ("GDC") imposed, under the terms of any agreement in sufficiently
definite terms a condition that GDC would not seller-finance the sale of Zion
View Estates ("ZVE") to anyone if Dave Wright or a manufactured housing
company were involved in the transaction in any way, shape or form?
[R. 1890] (emphasis added.)
As explained in GDC's opening brief, fraudulent nondisclosure arises
independently of any contractual obligation. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,
TJ22, 48 P.3d 235 (duty of disclosure arises "'independent of any implied or express
contracts'") (quoting Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980)). Thus, contrary
to Wardley's argument, the operative question is not whether the terms of any contract
between the parties imposed a condition to disclose certain information. It is whether
Wardley failed to disclose material facts to GDC that it knew would impact GDC's
decision to enter into the transaction in the first instance. See Yazd v. Woodside Homes
Corp., 2006 UT 47,fflflO,14, 158 P.3d 562. Consequently, the jury's special verdict
finding that there was no agreement imposing a condition that Wright could not be
involved if GDC seller financed the purchase of the property is not inextricably
intertwined with a fraudulent nondisclosure claim.

1

Wardley also seeks to distract this Court's attention from the trial
court's erroneous directed verdict by injecting an argument concerning fiduciary duty
into its brief. But the first question of the special jury verdict form—the only question
answered by the jury—is specific. It is not dispositive of a fiduciary duty claim; nor does
it remotely address a fiduciary duty claim. Indeed, fiduciary duty was not addressed at
3

Thus, to accept Wardley's argument would require this Court to accept a
proposition: that the jury would have answered a fundamentally different question in the
same way. But to do so this Court would have to do what it cannot—go into the jury
room and weigh evidence, assess credibility, and then decide the facts. That role, of
course, belongs to the jury, not the courts. See Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, Tfl8,
990 P.2d 933 ('"[T]he court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the
province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the facts.'") (quoting Management
Comm. v. Gravstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1982)). And speculation
concerning what the jury might do if asked a fundamentally different question constitutes
an impermissible weighing of the evidence and judging of the facts.
Against this standard, contrary to Wardley's arguments, this Court cannot simply
assume that because the jury found the parties had not created a contractual requirement
to disclose Wright's involvement that it also would have found that Wardley was
unaware that GDC required Wardley to notify it if Wardley became aware that Wright
was involved on the Butterfield side of the transaction. As GDC explained in detail in its
opening brief, GDC, through Steve Gilbert, required Wardley to communicate this
information—irrespective of any contractual obligation—to enable GDC to make an

all until the third question on the special jury verdict form, a question that remains
unanswered to this day. Nevertheless, the Wardley Defendants would have this Court
speculate as to how the jury would have answered the fiduciary duty question and then,
based, on that speculation, further speculate how the jury would have answered a
question addressing fraud. Again, it is not this Court's prerogative to guess what the jury
might have done if it had considered the fraud claim. Rather, it is for this Court to assure
that a jury is permitted to consider that claim, under the circumstances presented here.
4
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informed decision regarding seller financing. At the very least, GDC presented sufficient
evidence at trial to have the jury—not the trial court—determine that question.
Consequently, the trial court erred in refusing to send the matter to the jury and this Court
should therefore reverse that decision and remand this matter for a new trial on this issue.
B.

The Wardley Defendants' Remaining Arguments Show Only That The
Fraud Claim Should Have Gone To The Jury.

Wardley's remaining arguments concerning the directed verdict issue are equally
without merit. As an initial matter Wardley does not contest that it had a legal duty to
disclose material information to GDC. This concession alone, when coupled with clear
Utah law on the issue, should result in a reversal at least with respect to Riddle and
Melling because the trial court's directed verdict as to Riddle and Melling was premised
on the erroneous determination that a reasonable jury could not find a duty to disclose.
See Opening Br. at 22. But the existence of a legal duty is a question of law, not fact.
See Yazd, 2006 UT 47 at |14. And Wardley appears to concede that each defendant
owed a duty of disclosure to GDC.
With respect to the remaining two elements of fraudulent nondisclosure, GDC
previously discussed each element and addressed the Wardley Defendants one by one,
detailing the evidence GDC presented at trial against each defendant, the existence of
which should have resulted in the trial court sending the issue to the jury as to each
defendant. On appeal, Wardley refuses to confront this evidence and thus fails to show,
as it must, that GDC presented no competent evidence that would have supported a
verdict in GDC's favor. Instead, Wardley resorts to a series of generalized closing

5

arguments. But again, in approaching the issue this way, Wardley asks this Court to do
what it cannot: become the jury and weigh and consider the evidence.
In rapid succession, Wardley argues (at Br. 26-34): (i) that GDC presented no
evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that Wright's involvement was
material; (ii) that GDC presented no evidence that any of the Wardley Defendants knew
of Wright's involvement in the seller-financed transaction "or acted with intent to
defraud"; (iii) that GDC suffered no damages; and (iv) that Wardley's actions were not
the proximate cause of GDC's damages. Each argument is wrong.
1.

Materiality and Intent

With respect to Wardley's first two arguments, GDC presented the trial court with
a wealth of evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that Wright's involvement
was material; that each of the Wardley Defendants knew about Wright's involvement;
and, finally, that each of the Wardley Defendants failed to disclose it. See Opening Br. at
24-35. The impact of this evidence on the directed verdict becomes particularly clear
where, as here, the trial court was required to view the evidence and the inferences
arising therefrom in a light most favorable to GDC. See Dames, 2008 UT 51 at <p0.
Instead of confronting this evidence and its impact, Wardley argues that Wright's
involvement was material only if Wright was a party to the transaction. Wardley
misunderstands its duty.
Wardley does not get to decide what information is material and what is not by
establishing its own arbitrary line at who is or is not signing the purchase agreement.

6
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Materiality is determined by importance, not by signatures. .See Yazd, 2006 UT 47 at
Tf34. And the importance of information is gauged by whether it could be expected to
influence whether or not a party actually enters into a transaction. See id.
As explained in GDC's opening brief, that is a jury question and there was
sufficient evidence to go to the jury on that question. See Opening Br. at 24-35. Indeed,
there is sufficient evidence to show that each of the Wardley Defendants knew that the
information concerning Wright would influence GDC's decision on whether to enter into
the transaction. There is evidence that this is what they were told and this is why they did
not disclose the fact to GDC because they feared it might influence GDC's decision
thereby killing the transaction. That is the very definition of material information. The
Wardley Defendants were not entitled to simply shrug off this information and make their
own arbitrary decision that they did not have to disclose it because, in their view, Wright
was not technically a party to the transaction.
For the same reasons, GDC presented sufficient evidence to send the question of
Wardley's intent to defraud to the jury. Namely, GDC presented evidence that each of
the Wardley Defendants (i) knew of GDC's objections to Wright's involvement; (ii)
knew Wright was involved; and (iii) refused to disclose Wright's involvement to GDC.
See Opening Br. at 24-35. The jury was entitled to weigh this evidence, consider
credibility, and determine whether each defendant made a conscious decision to hide this
information with the intent to defraud GDC to preserve their commissions. At the very
least, sufficient evidence was presented from which the jury could find fraudulent intent,

7

particularly when the facts and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to GDC.
See Andalex Res.. Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
intent to defraud may be inferred through circumstantial evidence). But the trial court
erroneously removed any such examination from the jury.
2.

Damages

Wardley next claims both that GDC suffered no damages from Wardley's fraud
and, in any event, that Wardley's actions were not the proximate cause of GDCs
damages. Again, Wardley is wrong. First, contrary to Wardley's contentions, GDC is
not trying to "profit from any nondisclosure." Far from it. GDC was damaged by
Wardley's fraud. Damages recoverable in a fraud action include all damages proximately
caused by the fraudulent conduct, including lost profits and related consequential
damages. See Ong Int'l Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993).
Consequential damages include "expenses resulting from fraud, loss of good will, any
expenditures in mitigation of damages, lost earnings, prejudgment interest, and loss of
interest on loans required to finance the business." IcL at 457 n.44. So long as the
"damages are proven with reasonable certainty and are a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's act," id at 457, they are available to GDC.
Contrary to the implication of Wardley's arguments, these are questions of fact for
the jury to determine, not the trial court. Sec Kraatz v. Heritage Imp., 2003 UT App 201,
^|54, 71 P.3d 188 (to prove damages within a reasonable certainty requires "sufficient
evidence to enable the trier of fact to make a reasonable approximation"); Alta Health

8
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Strategies. Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv., 930 P.2d 280? 285-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(reversing directed verdict because sufficient evidence had been presented on the
question of whether damages were reasonably foreseeable).
At trial, GDC presented both written and oral evidence of damages suffered as a
result of Wardley's fraud, and the amount of those damages (in excess of a million
dollars). The evidence showed: (i) unpaid interest and principal on the Butterfield note;
(ii) foreclosure costs; (iii) payment of property taxes; (iv) attorney fees and costs incurred
in the bankruptcy proceedings; and (v) expenditure of funds to return ZVE to marketable
shape. [RT. Ill at 7-25; Trial Exs. 98, 110, 111 & 112.] All of these damages are
recoverable in a fraud action. See Ong Int'l Inc., 850 P.2d at 457. Wardley's claim that
GDC suffered no compensable damages simply is wrong, but in any case, it is a question
for the jury to decide.
For the same reasons, Wardley errs in singling out the approximately $600,000
GDC spent in fees and associated costs defending itself in California bankruptcy
proceedings. Wardley contends that GDC's damages were not reasonably foreseeable.
Again, Wardley forgets that foreseeability is a jury question. See CCI Mech. Serv., 930
P.2d at 285-86; see also Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 1148 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that the determination of whether an expenditure of legal fees
qualifies as reasonably foreseeable consequential damages is a jury question). Similarly,
the question of proximate cause has long been a jury question. ISee Farmers Grain Coop.
v. Frederickson, 321 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1958) ("The question of proximate cause is

9

likewise a jury question."); Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ^28, 67 P.3d 1017
(when reasonable persons could differ, proximate cause is a jury question).
Importantly, and ignored by Wardley on appeal, the trial court rejected its
causation argument, not once, but twice: first in the Wardley Defendants' failed
summary judgment motion [R. 1626-1628] and then again in their motion for a directed
verdict [RT. VI at 231-232]. Indeed, the trial court denied Wardley's requested directed
verdict on causation and damages, reasoning: "I think a reasonable juror might - again,
taking all inferences and reading all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff- might find that the bankruptcy and the associated hell for the plaintiff was
foreseeable when $1.6 million worth of property and $1.1 million worth of debt was at
issue." [RT. VI at 231:16-21.]2
The trial court's reasoning was sound on this issue. Viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to GDC, a reasonable juror could indeed determine that these
damages were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Wardley Defendants'
concealment of material facts. After all, Steve Gilbert specifically told the Wardley
Defendants at the mediation that Wright's involvement would lead to inevitable
foreclosure. [RT. II at 161:23-25, 162:1-3.] GDC's concerns proved prophetic.
Butterfield—relying on Wright and Wright's entities (Mobile Mansions and Capital
The trial court's statement was in the context of Wardley's motion for directed
on the breach of contract claim. But the foreseeability of damages in both tort and
contract contexts is virtually identical. See Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at %12 (breach of
contract case citing standard from both a legal malpractice Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d
433, 439 (Utah 1996) and tort case, Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245-46
(Utah 1985)).
10
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Housing) to perform and service Butterfield's debt to GDC—later defaulted on his
performance, and ZVE went into foreclosure. Then, the bankruptcy of Mobile Mansions
ensued as a direct result of Wright's involvement in ZVE and the funneling of money
from Mobile Mansions to attempt to service Butterfield's note to GDC. See Opening Br.
at 6-12 (evidence cited therein).
Had the Wardley Defendants disclosed what they knew about Wright's
involvement, GDC could have fully investigated the matter, could have refused to enter
the deal, and could have avoided the subsequent bankruptcy ordeal. When viewed in the
light most favorable to GDC, it is no stretch to conclude that it was reasonably
foreseeable (as the trial court concluded) that a default on a million dollar note might
place the parties in bankruptcy proceedings, which would inevitably require the
expenditure of attorney fees and related costs. Once that is accepted, it must also be
accepted that the fees and costs expended in the bankruptcy proceeding are also
foreseeable and compensable.
The Wardley Defendants cannot plausibly escape liability by claiming that GDC's
bankruptcy nightmare and the damages it suffered are more substantial than they thought.
There is no legal doctrine that cuts off damages when the result of the fraudulent conduct
is severe. This would allow those who would defraud to benefit from their conduct -

3

Mr. Gilbert testified that, if he knew Wright had set foot on the property, he
would have investigated why Wright was there. [RT. II at 159-160). Indeed, Mr. Gilbert
further testified that, upon hearing a rumor that Wright was attempting to sell lots at
ZVE, he initiated that investigation by calling his agent and asking about it. [RT. II at
199-200.]
11

arguing that they knew the conduct would cause damages but not "that much." Case law
prohibits that benefit. See, e.g., Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201 at f 54. In any event, the trial
court should not have taken this issue from the jury—whose prerogative it was to decide
this fact.
In sum, because reasonable minds could differ as to whether GDC was damaged
as a result of the Wardley Defendants' conduct, the trial court's directed verdict should
be reversed.
II.

REVERSAL OF THE DIRECTED VERDICT NEGATES THE FEE
AWARD.
Reversal of the directed verdict should also result in vacating the Wardley

Defendants' fee award because there would remain an issue as to which party will be the
"prevailing party." This issue cannot be resolved until after a new trial on the fraud
claim. See Opening Br. at 35-37. The Wardley Defendants do not contest this argument,
and therefore, if this Court reverses the directed verdict, it must also reverse the award of
attorney fees award.
III.

THE WARDLEY DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT SHOWN THAT THE FEE
AWARD WAS REASONABLE.
A.

The Court Must Address The Legal Standards For Determining
Reasonableness In Order To Determine Whether The Trial Court's
Award Was Reasonable.

In opposing GDC's argument concerning the attorney fee award, Wardley argues,
as a threshold matter, that the Court should reject the issue summarily because GDC
failed to marshal the evidence. Wardley fundamentally misapprehends GDC's

12
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arguments, as well as the legal nature of a reasonableness determination. "[T]he
reasonableness of an award of attorney fees ordinarily presents a question of law, with
some measure of discretion given to the trial court in applying the reasonableness
standard to a given set of facts." Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah
1996) (Durham, J., lead opinion); see also Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, TJ31, 164 P.3d 384 (quoting Salmon
standard). Indeed, reasonableness must be reviewed as a legal question; otherwise trial
courts would have unbridled discretion to award fees in the absence of applicable legal
principles that establish the parameters of reasonableness. See, e.g., Martinez, 2007 UT
42 at Tf32; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 & n.5 (Utah 1994), modified in part by
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096. In other words, while trial courts are granted
some discretion, that discretion does not extend to permit the trial court to betray
established legal parameters in determining reasonableness.
In this regard, GDC does not assert that the entirety of the fee request, or the
subsequent award, was unreasonable. As set forth in its opening brief, GDC targeted
specific elements of the fees that the trial court should have reduced (or not awarded at
all) based upon the governing legal standards and, in some instances, the complete lack of
evidentiary support. To make these arguments, GDC meticulously combed through all of
Wardley's evidence submitted with its fee request (comprising just two affidavits and a
stack of billing records) and, where possible, GDC assigned dollar values as to each

13

category. Wardley has never—either below or on appeal—contested these dollar values.
As a result, as to each category (with the possible exceptions of duplication and
apportionment—dealt with separately) there is no factual dispute as to the amount of the
fees. Rather, GDC's argument requires the determination of whether the trial court
violated the legal standards for determining reasonableness, thereby abusing its discretion
in awarding those fees.5
Further, the evidence Wardley submitted in support of its fee application
amounted to two affidavits and a stack of billing records. No in-court testimony was
offered, as Wardley suggests in its brief. Understandably, after the trial court subtracted
only $1,625 from an approximately $400,000.00 fee request—handing out a lecture to
appellate courts along the way—Wardley now seeks to circumvent appellate review. But
this Court should reject Wardley's efforts to use marshaling to achieve that end. Cf.
Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at ^f 19-20 (appellate courts retain discretion to consider the record
independently and determine if there is factual support for the trial court's decision).

4

This stands in stark contrast to Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201,
1J60, 71 P.3d 188, and Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, ^J10, 213 P.3d
13, on which Wardley relies. There, in contrast to GDC's approach, the non-prevailing
parties made general challenges to the fee requests without the aid of undisputed,
assigned dollar values. Moreover, here Wardley submitted no evidence at all concerning
some claims. See infra. It cannot complain that GDC failed to marshal evidence that
does not exist. See Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 1998).
5
Moreover, marshaling applies only when challenging a factual finding. See
Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at fl7 & n.3. As set forth below and in GDC's opening brief, the
trial court's attorney fee decision was founded not so much on factual findings as it was
an articulation of the trial court's own opinions and beliefs as to the governing legal
standards.
14
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B.

That "GDC Asked For A Lot Of Fees"—Is Not A Legitimate Basis For
Rubber Stamping A Fee Award.

Wardley's next general contention (at Br. 39-40) is that GDC is barred from
challenging its fee request because GDC also incurred substantial attorney fees. This
contention is without merit. First, it misstates the law. The cases on which Wardley
relies for its "estoppel" proposition, support no such theory. In Hooban v. Unicity
International Inc., 2009 UT App 287, \9, 220 P.3d 485, this Court was simply addressing
whether a party could receive fees under the reciprocal fees statute, Utah Code § 78B-5286. See id. at TH[9-10. The reciprocal fees statute is not at issue in this case, rendering
Hooban inapplicable. Similarly, in Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222
(Utah 1998), the court neither held nor suggested that if a party seeks a substantial fee
award he is thereafter estopped from challenging the other party's request for fees.
Instead, Rothey concerned whether estoppel was properly raised in the pleadings as a
defense to a claim for fees where notice was not given under an indemnity contract. See
id. at 1224. That narrow legal analysis and holding has no application to this case.
There simply is no authority supporting the proposition that "if you ask for a lot of
fees, then we get a lot of fees, regardless of how reasonable." This approach is not
supported by the Dixie State Bank factors. Nor is it mentioned in Rule 1.5(a) of the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct governing the reasonableness of fees. Application of
these standards reveals that allegations in the pleadings, lega] arguments, and posturing in
litigation simply cannot displace applicable legal standards. Cf Fericks v. Lucy Ann
Soffe Trust 2004 UT 85, f25, 100 P.3d 1200 (rejecting party's argument that it was
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entitled to fees based on other party's demand for fees in a complaint, reasoning that
"allegations in a complaint generally cannot alter the composition of parties to a
contract").
C.

There Is No Basis To Require GDC To Pay Wardley For Nearly
$55,000 In Fees It Expended On An Unsuccessful Motion.

Wardley similarly errs in contending that the trial court correctly awarded nearly
$545407.50 in attorney fees expended on Wardley's unsuccessful motion for summary
judgment. Wardley argues that even if its motion was unsuccessful, it can nevertheless
require GDC to reimburse the fees incurred if something in the litigation "changes" the
propriety of the ruling. There is no basis for this remarkable claim, and in any event,
such a principal does not help Wardley here.
In an effort to support this proposition, Wardley cites Cache County v. Beus, 2005
UT App 503, 128 P.3d 63. But in Beus, this Court admonished the trial court for doing
exactly what the trial court did here: awarding all attorney fees incurred from the
inception of the case, without regard to whether any particular motion was unsuccessful.
See id. at ^[17. Wardley relies, without context, on this Court's statement in Beus, that
"nothing since has changed the propriety of that ruling." But when read in context, this
statement refers to the propriety of the previous appeal; it does not create the rule posited
by Wardley. See id. (citing Cache County v. Beus, 1999 UT App 134,142, 978 P.2d
1043). The court in no way held or suggested that an ultimately successful party can
recover for every failed motion made in the case. Moreover, any such holding would
violate the principles of ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254.
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In ProMax, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendants, who defended the
judgment of the trial court, were entitled to fees for prevailing on appeal. See id. at ^[32.
However, the court flatly rejected the defendants' request for the award of attorney fees
incurred in pursuing an unsuccessful motion to dismiss the appeal. The Court held that
the defendants simply were not entitled to fees incurred in pursuit of the unsuccessful
motion. See id. at ^[32-33. Thus, although the defendants prevailed on appeal, they
were denied their request for fees incurred pursuing an unsuccessful motion to dismiss
the appeal, which, if granted, would have netted the same result. In other words, the
ProMax defendants' ultimate success did not open the door for the award of fees related
to the unsuccessful motion.
There is no practical difference between ProMax and the instant case. Here,
Wardley ultimately succeeded at trial. It does not follow, however, that it is entitled to an
award of fees incurred in pursuit of its unsuccessful motion, which, if successful, would
have netted the same result. Any other determination subverts the very authority that
controls this issue, which requires the trial court to make a reasonableness determination
as a check against a prevailing party being awarded excessive fees. An award of attorney
fees must be reasonable; not liberal.
Moreover, even assuming Beus supports the proposition advanced by Wardley, the
result did not uchange[] the propriety" of the trial court's denial of Wardley's motion for
summary judgment. First, Wardley's proximate causation argument, which Wardley
concedes was the principal summary judgment argument, was never vindicated at trial.
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Rather, Wardley revived the argument in its directed verdict motion, only to have the trial
court reject it for the second time. [RT. VI at 231-232.]
The remainder of Wardley's argument—that its failed summary judgment motion
was an unabated success because GDC later voluntarily dismissed certain tort claims—is
rampant speculation. Wardley surmises, without any evidence, that GDC's decision to
dismiss those claims was based on the strength of Wardley's motion for summary
judgment—a motion that GDC defeated. An award of attorney fees must be based on
evidence. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (u[A]n award
of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the record."). Wardley's speculation
that GDC dismissed a few tort claims due to the strength of the failed summary judgment
motion is not evidence. Nor does Wardley's position make sense: GDC prevailed and
defeated Wardley's motion.
As a result, the sole support for the decision to award fees for the failed motion is
the trial court's rationale—its views on summary judgment practice—which cannot
justify its fee award for the unsuccessful motion. In fact, even if this Court wants to
expand the field of discretion to allow for recovery of fees where an unsuccessful motion
has a strategic benefit, there must still be evidence that there actually was a strategic
benefit to an unsuccessful motion as opposed to an abstract principle that sometimes
there can be a benefit. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992)
("Although a trial court has direction to determine an award of attorney fees, the exercise
of that discretion must be based on an evaluation of the evidence."). As explained in
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GDC's opening brief, the record is devoid of any such evidence. It is, therefore, not
surprising that Wardley fails to support the award with any record citation. In the
absence of contrary evidence, the prevailing rule must be applied: a prevailing party
cannot recover attorney fees for time spent on an unsuccessful motion. See ProMax Dev.
Corp., 2000 UT 4 at ^[32. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to award Wardley nearly
$54,407.50 in fees and costs incurred pursuing the failed motion for summary judgment
should be reversed.
D.

The "Locality" Is St George.

Wardley likewise errs in its defense of the trial court's "locality" determination.
The undisputed evidence, in fact, the only evidence presented to the trial court
concerning the rates customarily charged in the locality, is that Salt Lake City and St.
George attorney fee rates are markedly different. Wardley makes no effort to contest this
evidence. Instead, Wardley's argument is that this case was so complex that only Salt
Lake counsel was qualified to handle it. This argument fails for several reasons.
First, the record contains no evidence that this case was too complex for attorneys
located in and practicing out of St. George. Indeed, if that were the case Wardley must
concede that every cent of the approximately $60,000.00 it paid to Jones Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough's St. George office through the course of this litigation was
unreasonable because the case was simply too complex for Jones Waldo's St. George
based attorneys. Wardley cannot have it both ways.
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Second, and again without any evidentiary support, Wardley speculates that the
evidence of complexity is hidden in GDC's own decision to retain Salt Lake counsel to
handle the matter through trial. However, GDC originally filed the case in Salt Lake
City. Shortly thereafter, another defendant sought to move the case to St. George as a
more appropriate venue, a motion that Wardley (through their St. George based counsel
at Jones Waldo) joined. [R. 165.] The motion was granted and GDC simply decided to
continue with the attorneys who had started the case, rather than retain new counsel at
that point. Thus the move to St. George was not GDC's decision, and all parties had the
option, at that point, to retain St. George counsel, at St. George rates, or bear the
difference in costs related to counsel's locality.
Wardley also implies that GDC's retention of Salt Lake based co-counsel to assist
GDC's St. George based appellate counsel on appeal suggests that the case is too
complex for a St. George attorney. But again, the record is devoid of any evidence that
would support the contention that the matter was too complex for St. George counsel, or
that Salt Lake attorneys are more adept and sophisticated in handling complex cases than
attorneys practicing in St. George. In other words, Wardley simply seeks to have this
Court adopt Wardley's speculation as a reason to affirm the trial court's decision.
Casting aside Wardley's erroneous contentions, the issue of locality (like all other
issues in this appeal) comes down to the application of the governing legal standard. In
this instance, the governing legal standard provides that the billing rate must be consistent
with the rate customarily charged in the locality for similar services. Dixie State Bank,
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764 P.2d at 990. On this question, Wardley suggests that the term "locality" should not
be defined by its common, everyday meaning, but instead must be defined to include
where the "specialist resides." Otherwise, St. George parties will be deprived of
obtaining competent, qualified legal services, better advice, and the representation of
better qualified attorneys from Salt Lake.6 But again, the record is devoid of any
evidence that this case was so complex, or of such magnitude, that Salt Lake counsel was
required.
Granted, attorneys are not all cut from the same cloth. Some are better than
others; and some better known. But to suggest that one's zip code is the determinative
measure of his or her skills as a lawyer is, at best, arbitrary. A zip code does not
magically make one a "specialist." Indeed, it is not altogether clear what "specialty" was
involved in this case. It was, to be sure, a hard fought case with many different witnesses
and facts. But it was not a complex antitrust, patent, or securities case. At bottom, it was
a breach of contract and intentional tort case. Nothing in the record suggests that no one
in the locale of St. George was incapable of handling the matter. Rather, when it comes
to determining reasonableness of fees, renowned and noted lawyers who are compensated
handsomely by well-to-do clients are not entitled to a rate well above that received by

6

Assuming that Salt Lake attorneys carry some inherent advantages unavailable to
the St. George Bar, St. George parties are not precluded from retaining Salt Lake
Counsel. Rather, under the existing standard, a St. George party who prevails with the
assistance of a Salt Lake attorney simply must bear the difference in costs between Salt
Lake regional rates and St. George regional rates if fees are to be awarded.
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competent and experienced lawyers in the local market. See Coulter v. Tennessee, 805
F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1986). It appears, however, that this is what occurred here.
If this Court were to embrace Wardley's "specialist" rule—without the benefit of
any evidence—it would expand the concept of "locality" and its geographic reach to
anywhere a party may hire legal counsel. The "locality" of St. George could then include
Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, or Los Angeles simply because a party claims that counsel is a
"specialist," or argues that the case is just "too complex" for the locals. Localities such
as Vernal, Kanab, and Monticello would face expansion to include New York, Chicago,
and Los Angeles simply because a party retains counsel from those locations due to the
issues presented.
The term "locality" must mean something. And it does. As set forth in GDC's
opening brief, it means immediate geographic proximity. See Webster's New World
College Dictionary 842 (4th ed. 2006) (defining "locality" as "a place, district,
neighborhood"). As applied to this case, locality refers to St. George and the prevailing
St. George rates. And notwithstanding the trial court's opinions, and Wardley's
argument, mere opinions cannot substitute for evidence. And Wardley submitted no
evidence whatsoever to the trial court on this issue. Discretion may be broad, but it can
be exceeded. And when a trial court ignores undisputed evidence and enters orders that
are contrary to that evidence, it exceeds its discretion. The undisputed evidence in this
case was that the rates charged by Wardley's attorneys were not consistent with the rates
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charged in the locale where the case was tried. The trial court thus erred in refusing to
reduce the award of fees accordingly.
E.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Forcing GDC To Pay For
Duplicate Work.

Wardley makes no serious effort to contest that it is per se unreasonable to award
attorneys fees incurred as a result of a change of counsel. To do so would require it to
embrace the proposition that a non-prevailing party must pay different attorneys for doing
the same thing. So instead of challenging the legal standard, Wardley simply contends
that it is entitled to recover fees expended for the transition between the Jones Waldo and
Snell & Wilmer law firms because GDC failed to pinpoint duplicative work. Wardley
misunderstands GDC's actual argument.
In the instant case, Wardley retained Snell & Wilmer to replace Jones Waldo after
the case had been litigated for some time, and after Jones Waldo had billed Wardley over
$60,000.00 for litigating this matter. It is beyond dispute that Snell & Wilmer duplicated
some of Jones Waldo's work as a result of the transition. After all, attorneys do not
osmotically learn simply from receiving a box of documents. Attorneys must read
depositions and review motions, pleadings, and correspondence, etc., and become
familiar with and review all of the work that had been performed (and charged for)
previously in the case.
Therefore, given that Snell & Wilmer replaced Jones Waldo well into the life of
this case, this Court should accept that of the $338,390.00 charged by Snell & Wilmer
and the $61,146.00 charged by Jones Waldo, some work was duplicated as a result of the
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transition. Determining what duplication occurred, the exact time and amounts, was
impossible for GDC because Wardley refused to divulge that information. As a result,
GDC was forced to examine the billing records in an attempt to ferret out duplication
related to the transition. Once GDC identified such work, it then objected to it as noncompensable. Wardley, in the face of this argument, had every opportunity to submit
additional evidence to the trial court concerning the extent of the duplicative efforts to
ensure that GDC would not be double billed. Wardley did not, even though making the
effort was their burden. See Cottonwood Mall Co., 830 P.2d at 268.
Nevertheless, the trial court refused to accept GDC's argument on this issue and
refused to reduce so much as a nickel from Wardley's fee request for duplication. That
decision is not reasonable. See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah
1998) (holding that a trial court "may not award wholesale all attorney fees requested if
they have not been allocated as to separate claims and/or parties"). Nor is the Wardley
Defendants' argument for rubber stamping that decision. A party opposing a fee request
is not required to go on a snipe hunt, aimlessly wandering the dark, beating the brush to
chase out something that does not exist. As our appellate courts have repeatedly
recognized, the person who has the information controls the information; thus, the burden
to prove non-duplicative efforts is at all times on the party seeking the fee award. See
Opening Br. at 38-39 (citing cases).
GDC used the information available to it and challenged Wardley's fee request.
Wardley failed to meet GDC's challenge with any evidence that would show that GDC
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was not being charged for Snell & Wilmer's duplication of work performed by Jones
Waldo prior to the switch. The trial court's flat refusal to reduce the award based on
GDC's duplication argument was an abuse of its discretion. It should therefore be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and those in GDC's opening brief, this Court
should reverse the trial court's directed verdict and remand the matter for a new trial on
GDC's fraudulent concealment claim. Further, in the event that the Court does not
reverse the directed verdict, it should reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees and
remand with instructions to determine the reasonableness of those fees through
application of correct legal standards.
DATED THIS 30th day of March 2010.
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